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The 2010 The 2010 World Cup was clearly successful as a sporting event and as an advertisement for South Africa's capacity to host a global event. Expectations were high prior to the tournament regarding the home team's performance and the tournament's magnitude as a major event and potential benefit for the South African economy.
The home team's strong performance relative to reasonable expectations was the source of much local pride. Further, the tournament was an organisational and logistical success (ZORN 2010) to ensure that the tournament was within budget (PEDRONCELLI 2010) . The costs of the stadiums and the transportation infrastructure were almost entirely publicly financed, but those costs should not be attributed solely to the World Cup, due to the long-term benefits of such investments. It is too early to assess the ultimate impact of these public investments on the long-run growth path of the economy.
On a micro-level, there are always winners, losers and those who are unaffected by such a major event. For example, there are reports of increased demand for vuvuzelas, travel in luxury coaches, for tour operators, and for tourist attractions in close proximity to stadiums. 2 Meanwhile South African manufacturers seem to have been largely unaffected by the event. 3 In terms of the events' negative impact, the lives of many South Africans were disrupted by the preparation for the tournament and by the tournament itself.
To appreciate the total economic impact of a major sporting event, it is necessary to move beyond data on individual enterprises and sectors to investigate the ef-1 A few critics did point to the low attendance at some of the matches. FIFA president Blatter argues that this was not due to an inappropriate pricing policy (for details see MAENNIG and DU PLESSIS 2007) , but instead that it was due to a poor uptake of hospitality tickets. Overall, 95% of the tickets to the matches were sold (N.N., 2010b). (Baumann, 2010; N.N. 2010c) . Some estimates even exceed 500,000, such as the estimate reportedly made by the LOC mid-way through the tournament (Naidu and Piliso, 2010 This paper contrasts such numbers with evidence from two sources. We first use data on actual arrivals at the international airports. Second, we use data on occupancy rates in the hotels of the major cities. To begin the analysis, we note that the number of international airplane landings did not increase substantially be- We assume that the World Cup did not affect the seat capacity of the international airplanes used on the relevant routes. We also assume that the capacity utilisation of the additional flights was always close to 100% as is typical on this route and other overseas flights. We are aware that this creates a bias towards higher numbers of tourists because some of the landings presumably did not bring many tourists but were intended to fly tourists (or less successful soccer teams) out of the country. With approximately 7 additional per day arrivals over a period of 33 days (from June 9 th until July 11 th ) the largest possible increase in tourist arrivals could have been close to 90,000. We now turn to the second approach to estimating additional tourism from the World Cup, that using hotel occupancy rates. The data in Figure 2 should be read alongside the information on capacity expansion in Table 1 , which indicated that growth especially occurred within high-end accommodation. Figure 2 shows the extent to which World Cup visitors used Gauteng as their base for the tournament due to the number of stadiums in close The data in Table 1 As a special form of crowding-out, price-crowding-out is sometimes mentioned in the scholarly literature but rarely supported with data. In the case of South Africa, a special form of price-crowding-out may have been at work: self-defeating prophecies via an ex-ante supply-price-crowding-out channel. This form of pricecrowding-out must be distinguished from some press reports that hinted at the high cost for Europeans and Americans to attend the World Cup, which is usually interpreted through the phrase: "the problem is that it is a long-haul destination"
(N.N. 2010d).
The long flight does not seem to have been the main constraint, however. Rather, the pricing policy in the tourist industry seems to have played an important role. the realisation by the airlines that they would not be able to reach sufficient bookings for their flights at those fares. However, even after this correction, prices for flights were consistently at least 50% higher than in the non-World Cup periods.
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Flight prices for the other connections between the major European airports and Johannesburg had similar developments to the one describe for Frankfurt. We restrict ourselves to providing an additional figure 3b for London. 13 The pricecrowding-out effect indicated by these figures might have been biased downwards because our statistics exclusively use the cheapest flights, and do not control for the number of flight seats available for this price. The peculiar price development on August 9 might be explained by the South African public holiday on that day. This may have caused there to be fewer flights by SAA on that day, which raises the prices elsewhere. 13 The figures for the other European flight connections are available on request from the authors. The negligible increase of the capacities of air carriers in combination with the sharp price increases depicts an inelastic supply and high windfall profits for the sector. It remains unclear as to whether the modest supply reaction by airlines was due to (i) internal information that on the basis of their pricing strategies, no additional supply would be needed or (ii) that the inherent logistical costs of changing the flight schedules would have been too high to increase supply.
17 15 We also collected data from www.hotels.com, which did not result in different conclusions. 16 Details are available form the authors on request. 
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The economy of a host nation may well experience increased income from such price effects, that is, higher prices may be accompanied by higher salaries. In the case of South Africa with its likely very elastic labour supply and its near-zero events-capacity effects, it seems more likely that the price increases translated to higher profits for capital owners. In the case of airfares, most of the profit clearly (with the exception of flights by South African Airways) went abroad. In the case of the hotel industry, no data on the capital shares of foreign investors are available, but at least in the case of the international hotel chains, a high proportion of the profit will not stay in South Africa (MATHESON 2009).
In sum, according to our data on additional international airplane landings, we do not see any evidence for a net increase in World-Cup-related overseas tourism beyond some 40.000 to approximately 90,000 persons. Even in World Cup cities, occupancy rates were far from 100% during the World Cup, implying that the South African economy could not make full use of its resources. At this stage, we think it is fair to say that early and overly optimistic forecasts of approximately 400,000 overseas visitors contributed to the smaller-thanexpected tourism effect. These studies contributed to self-defeating prophecies:
they induced pricing behaviour in important segments of the tourism industry that damped the potential increase in the number of tourists.
Other Short-term Economic Effects and Potential Longterm Effects
A feel-good effect might be the most evident positive outcome of Mega sporting events. Nevertheless, only a few studies attempt to evaluate this phenomenon of benefiting from (sports) events without active attendance at the stadium, and they do so through the concept of willingness to pay. Before the 2006 World Cup, only one out of five Germans surveyed revealed a 'willingness to pay' (WTP) greater than zero for the World Cup to take place in Germany (HEYNE et al., 2010 While the feel-good effect refers to the impact on locals, there is a related potential impact on foreigners due to an improved international perception of the host country. 20 There is at least preliminary evidence for such awareness effects in South Africa from the 2010 tournament. Figure 6 uses the number of Google hits as a proxy for awareness and plots the index of the number of Google hits for the search words "South Africa", "Germany", "Namibia", and " Google hits are a supply-side indicator, however, because Google records the number of webpages relevant to a given keyword. From a media economics perspective, the demand side is also interesting. As a proxy, we counted the number of members of the Facebook groups "South Africa 2010", "My South Africa", "Namibia", and "Super Bowl". Figure 7 plots the index of the number of these Facebook groups for each day from 19 April 2010 to 3 August 2010 and indicates that the number of members of "My South Africa" increased by approximately 20%, well above the near-to-zero increase of the Facebook group "Super Bowl". It must be mentioned, however, that the number of members of the group "Namibia" increased at nearly the same extent. In addition, the number of members in the group "South Africa 2010" increased by more than 170%, again relativising the awareness effect for the host country. . In addition, the average revenue per ticket increases due to the expansion of the area for VIP and business seating, so the overall ticket proceeds may also increase. These increased receipts improve the ability of a club to acquire top players in the international market, which, in the medium term, leads to increased national and international competitiveness.
Hence, from the point of view of sport, the new stadiums are a potential asset for South Africa. The central theme of this paper is the claim that the economic impact of international tourist arrivals during a soccer World Cup such as the 2010 tournament in South Africa, is considerably smaller, at least in the short run, than is widely expected prior to the event. This phenomenon is not unique to South Africa, but the general result of most ex-post analyses of World Cups. The focus of this paper was on accurately estimating tourist arrivals during the World Cup because the immediate economic impact must derive from these arrivals. We found a modest number of arrivals -a net increase of tourists of some 40,000 to 90,000 personscompared to optimistic expectations, which would have constrained their impact on local income and employment. 22 Self-defeating prophecies via an ex-ante supply-price-crowding-out channel have contributed to prevent international tourists to enter South Africa.
At present, it is not possible to determine the likelihood of positive medium-or long-term effects of the 2010 World Cup; based upon empirical studies of comparable sporting events, it appears that such effects cannot be guaranteed. 
